Hisham Al Rayes, acting CEO of GFH, had the following to say:
"We continue to focus on the strengthening of the balance sheet and the realignment of projects for successful exits, which is allowing us today to establish the Bank's credit rating in the market. We believe that this will also further enhance market confidence in the bank and allow for better business making in the future."
He added: "Furthermore, during the quarter we focused on building platforms to extract value from our existing assets. In this regard, we secured a number of strategic investors alongside GFH in Leeds United FC.
"We also saw progress on a number of our development projects and expect to see positive results later this year in particular in Bahrain and Tunis... We are confident that a stronger future is ahead and are determined to deliver higher returns for our investors and shareholders as we go forward."
First to the financial performance, looking at the income statement for H1 2013, we can see that there was a decrease in underlying profit compared to the same period in 2012 (pre-ownership of Leeds). Profit from operations was $4.9m vs. $5.7m which was largely driven by a decrease in "Other Income" of $12.2m.
Other Income is primarily a buy back of financing liabilities, recovery of expenses and of impaired facilities, therefore items which aren't related to the principal operations of the company. If we strip this out, the underlying income (predominantly from management fees) has actually increased significantly over the period, with management fees up from $1.6m to $5.2m.
The cashflow paints a slightly more challenging picture. If we strip out the proceeds from issues of convertible murabaha (essentially debt) and proceeds from treasury shares (equity raised), there was a cashflow shortfall of $20m over H1 2013. This is nothing new for GFH which has continued to suffer from cash burn at quite an alarming rate. They have always been able to refinance their liabilities, however it does raise questions as to how the company could support itself if creditors/investors stopped providing financing to GFH.
The most interesting aspect of the accounts relates to the reduction in assets held-for-sale. As stated in the 2012 accounts:
"The Group has an active plan to sell its stake in LUFC Holdings Limited, and accordingly, the asset and liabilities acquired were classified as held-for-sale and presented in the consolidated statement of financial position. Subsequent to the year end, the Group has commenced negotiations relating to the sale of its stake in LUFC Holdings Limited."
This resulted in a net total of assets held for sale of $45.5m. Looking at the H1 2013 balance sheet we can see that assets held for sale has actually decreased to $22.2m. Whilst small stakes in Leeds City Holdings Limited (LCHL) had been disposed of (see previous blog posts on IIBB), it doesn't account for such a significant reduction in ownership. Turning to note 11 of the accounts, GFH state that:
"During the period, based on placement of majority stake in LUFC to strategic investors, the Group de-consolidated LUFC Holdings Company."
Whilst it had been GFH's stated aim to reduce its holding in Leeds United to a minority stake in the short to medium-term, it had been thought that any sale had not been completed. Looking at this there are 2 scenarios:
- GFH has sold a majority stake to a single investor
- GFH has sold down a majority stake to a fund which it manages and which has numerous investors
The lack of announcements from GFH but the mention of strategic investors, would suggest to me that the latter was more accurate. This also fits in with GFH's business model as detailed here,
This would de-consolidate LCHL's accounts from GFH's (a nightmare from an accounting perspective), and formalise the investment structure. It could also suggest that the spike in management fees in H1 2013 related to the arrival of new investors (previous reports such as this article detail how GFH's business model relies on charging investors a "premium" in order to invest in projects).
So what does this all mean for Leeds fans? Well, the following:
- It would suggest that GFH have achieved their goal of selling down a majority stake to investors, and deconsolidating their balance sheet from that of LCHL's.
- The previously contradictory messages of long-term, sustainable ownership and holding the asset for sale can be understood a bit better. GFH as fund manager, and minority holder, will look to maximise value, and hold for the medium term (unless of course they receive an offer for an early exit at a reasonable profit).
- If it is a standard private equity fund structure, GFH as General Partner (GP) will have overall control for managing the fund and will decide and execute strategy at largely their own discretion. The other investors (or Limited Partners) will have little/no control over the strategy, and therefore one would hope that incidents such as investors' nephews being forced on our youth squad should not be something to worry about in future.
- Financially, unless we have further investment, it is likely that we will continue to work on a tight budget, hence the trailed messages on 2-3 year promotion horizons and "sustainable investment". The promotion of Leeds United will rely on the financial support of its fan base, and GFH managing to reduce the profligacy of the Ken Bates era, essentially "bread and butter" private equity (reduce overheads and increase turnover).